China-India Relations Hit a Bump

By S.P. SETH

Even as China is flexing its muscles with its neighbors in Asia-Pacific, it is also testing India’s resolve. This was recently demonstrated when Beijing cancelled an official-level meeting in New Delhi on their seemingly intractable border dispute.

China wanted India to cancel a religious gathering in New Delhi to be addressed by the Dalai Lama. When India declined, Beijing decided to cancel the official-level meeting.

China distrusts India’s hosting of the Dalai Lama and his government-in-exile (no longer led by the Dalai Lama), ever since he as was granted refuge in India after he and his entourage fled Tibet in 1959.

Since then, along with the unresolved border dispute between the two countries, the Dalai Lama has become the symbol of a continuing under-current of their prickly relationship.

When both the countries agreed in late-eighties to develop their relations, while simultaneously seeking a resolution of the border dispute through periodic talks, they hoped to overcome these differences through the gathering momentum of their relations in other areas.

It is true that they have made good progress in developing trade relationship but the border dispute and the shadow of the Dalai Lama has always been a limiting factor.

China is also not happy that India might have ambitions of becoming a competing Asian power, as well as becoming part of a containment ring around China as the United States’ strategic partner.

China’s India image is quite contradictory. At one level it has a low opinion of India as a nation. The People’s Daily noted, in a recent commentary, that, “India is expanding its military strength but it is still uncertain whether India will realize its dream of being a leading power, because India’s weak economy is severely unmatched with the image of a leading power.”

This is equally true of China, though its economy is much bigger than that of India. China’s economy has all sorts of distortions and imbalances. And its political system of one party rule is fanning social unrest.

China’s arrogance is a serious problem in its relations not only with India but also with its Asia-Pacific neighbors, as we have seen lately.

Expanding on its estimation of India, the People’s Daily added, “In addition, international communities and India’s surrounding countries are all suspecting and even being on guard against this kind of unbalanced development mode”--- whatever that means.

China apparently is alluding to India’s difficult relations with some of its neighbors, particularly Pakistan. And Beijing has been encouraging and aiding Pakistan to become a counter-point to India regionally.

But there are problems here. First, Pakistan is in all sorts of troubles internally and externally. Therefore, it is not a viable counter-point to India. Its deteriorating relations with the United States do give China space to make greater inroads into the country. However, its fractured society and polity makes any coherent policy approach difficult.

Besides, Pakistan’s Islamist character is at odds with China’s ongoing repression of Xinjiang’s Muslim population. It is important to remember that some of Xinjiang’s militants were trained in camps operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

As for India’s other neighbors, their relations with India might be prickly at times giving China some scope for creating trouble, but their relationship with India is quite normal, if not friendly.

In other words, China’s policy to hem in India regionally in its backyard is not succeeding, allowing it to develop relations with countries in South East Asia and East Asia.

India’s growing ties with Vietnam, including an accord for exploration of oil in Vietnam’s Spratly islands (also claimed by China), has raised Beijing’s ire. An Indian naval vessel was recently warned for entering South China Sea, though the warning was ignored.

India joined a number of regional countries raising the issue of China’s interference with passage of ships through South China Sea at the recent East Asia Summit.

China has serious problems with most of its neighbors in Asia-Pacific because of its maritime disputes, laying claim to South China Sea waters and islands, and with Japan in East China Sea.

Closer to India, China seems to have suffered a serious setback in its relations with Burma as its regime seeks to open up the country both internally and externally. The recent highly publicized visit of the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, is a pointer to this.

Earlier, the Burmese government went ahead with cancelling a multi-billion dollars Chinese-financed dam to supply electricity to vast areas of China across the border.

India is likely to be a beneficiary as Burma seeks to balance its relations to reduce its economic and political dependence on China.

What is worrying China, among other things, is that India is seeking to develop its relations with Asia-Pacific countries. Whenever New Delhi seeks to tread on, what China regards as, its patch, Beijing turns up the heat on the border by reigniting its dormant border claims to more territory on the Indian side of the border.

For instance, Beijing is now laying claim to Arunchal Pradesh calling it “south Tibet.”

They have never forgotten India for letting in the Dalai Lama and his entourage when they were escaping to seek refuge in 1959 from Chinese occupation of Tibet.

Even though India acknowledges China’s sovereignty over Tibet, it is not good enough for Beijing because the Dalai Lama continues to function in his spiritual role as the head of the Tibetan Buddhism. Beijing regarded the recent religious gathering in New Delhi a provocation, making it the occasion to cancel the official-level border talks, thus raising the temperature between the two countries.

Despite this, both China and India are unlikely to let their tense relations get out of control. Despite China’s distrust of India’s strategic relationship with the United States, it is not keen to push New Delhi into any formal military alliance between the two countries.

India is unlikely to forgo its strategic independence through any kind of a military pact. And Beijing is not keen to push it into such a situation.

Therefore, India-China relations, for the foreseeable future, will continue to remain in a state of controlled management, with both sides remaining distrustful of each other.

North Korea: The Death of a Dictator

By S P SETH

The television images of mass grief in North Korea over the death of its dictator, Kim Jong-il, says a lot about the country. While a fair bit of it is a command performance required by the regime, it is not difficult to imagine that many North Koreans might be genuinely sad over the passing of their Great Leader, as he was called. While North Korea is a basket case economically, with many of its people dying of starvation, its population has only known Kim dynasty as the country’s rulers ever since the Peninsula was divided in the aftermath of the WW11. The death of Kim Jong-il, who succeeded his father Kim Il-sung in 1994, does create a vacuum of sorts in a country so structured around the personality cult of its leader. Kim Jong-il’s anointed heir, Kim Jong-un, his third son, is an unknown quantity, having been groomed by his ailing father for only a little over a year before he died. He is very young at about 28 years of age and with little political experience, Kim Jong-un era might be a little rocky, though his lineage is an advantage for him in a country where virtually all authority has percolated down from the ruling Kim dynasty from the beginning.

For a small country with a population of about 24 million, Kim Jong-il’s death has created a lot of flutter in the major capitals of the world. Indeed, both the US and China are equally worried about the political transition in Pyongyang, and their foreign ministers have been in touch to ensure that the political transition there happens peacefully to ensure regional stability. While the US and China might agree broadly about this, they remain distrustful of how a crisis in North Korea might pan out. For China the Korean peninsula is its strategic space, and it regards the United States as an outside power. On the other hand, for the United States, South Korea is its military and strategic ally. Indeed, the two halves of Korea are technically still at war with each other-- the war having ended in an armistice without a peace treaty.

A bit of history to the Korean problem might be in order here. When North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, the peninsula was not only plunged into a brutal war but also became a theatre of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Additionally, there was a new China under the leadership of the Communist Party. It felt threatened when the US forces in South Korea started pushing closer toward its border with North Korea. This brought China into the war on behalf of its North Korean neighbor and ally. China’s forces finally pushed the US troops back and the war ended in 1953 with a truce along the 38^th parallel dividing North and South Korea. The two countries are now separated by a demilitarized zone, more or less eyeballing each other with the not infrequent fear of a military confrontation. Indeed, the sinking of a South Korean naval ship last year, believed to be by a North Korean torpedo, and the shelling of one of its islands, created the fear of a military flare up. The Korean peninsula remains a flash point with the likelihood of the US and China drawn into it by virtue of their alliance relationship--- China with North Korea, and the United States with South Korea.

Things might get even more than usually dangerous in the new situation created by the death of its dictator, Kim Jong-il, and the succession of his inexperienced son, Kim Jong-un. With North Korea’s economy in dire straits, and its political transition worrisome, there are fears that the country might collapse from within. If this were to happen, it would pose serious challenges for regional stability. For instance, China might be faced with the prospect of a large influx of refugees from across a crumbling North Korea. The same will be true of South Korea. For South Korea, the bigger challenge/danger will be to prepare for a possible unification of the Korean peninsula in the event of a North Korean collapse.

Even with South Korea’s relatively strong economy, the economic cost of integrating North Korea will be prohibitive. Germany’s example is instructive, but the West German economy was much larger and it wasn’t facing a precarious strategic situation: not knowing how China will react to such sweeping developments on the Korean Peninsula. With South Korea allied to the US, any unification process under South Korean terms and patronage will make the unified country a military ally of the United States. The prospect of having US troops on its border is unlikely to be acceptable to China. China, therefore, will seek to perpetuate the new political order in Pyongyang under the nominal or effective leadership of the younger Kim. The problem, though, is that even China doesn’t really know the internal workings of the hermit kingdom, as North Korea is called. Therefore, there are more questions thrown up by Kim Jong-il’s death than there are plausible answers.

What is known, though, is that North Korea is an economic basket case, hugely dependent on aid and trade with China. Despite this, Beijing’s political leverage over North Korea seems rather limited. Short of ditching its ally, thus giving the United States a foothold on its border, Beijing cannot afford to wash its hands off the hermit kingdom. This is why it is seeking to enlist the US cooperation in bringing about a peaceful political transition in North Korea to perpetuate the Kim dynasty.

The US interest in North Korea is centered on ridding it of its nuclear capability. China doesn’t favor a nuclear North Korea, but it is against joining the US and its allies for sanctioning North Korea, and worse. It doesn’t want to be a party to upsetting the status quo on the Korean peninsula lest it works against its strategic interest, as earlier discussed. If the political transition in North Korea goes peacefully avoiding an internal collapse, it is likely that the suspended talks for North Korea’s denuclearization might be revived, with Beijing as its venue.

China has played the host in these on-off talks in the last few years, but without much success. This is so because Pyongyang wants to use its nuclear leverage to get the maximum mileage from these talks through a phased process of linking abandonment of its nuclear program with concrete diplomatic, aid and trade concessions from its negotiating partners. On the other hand, the US and its allies would require North Korea to abandon its nuclear program first under a rigorous process of international verification. Only after that Pyongyang will become entitled to diplomatic recognition as well as trade and aid provision. This remains the sticking point, with seemingly no way out.

In any case, the immediate concern for the region and its principal stakeholders, like the US, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and North Korea, is the unpredictable nature of how the political transition in North Korea might pan out. Because: any internal implosion has the potential of plunging the region into a turbulent crisis that might involve the US and China on opposing sides. Hopefully, it will not come to that as the world can hardly afford another area of instability and confrontation.

Note: This article was first published in the Daily Times under a different title

US’s Iranian Obsession

By S.P.SETH

The storming of the British embassy in Iran, and the retaliatory measures by Britain and other Western countries to curtail diplomatic ties with that country, has escalated their cold war (so far) to a dangerous level. At its root is the perceived Iranian ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.

Why are the US and its allies so obsessed with Iran? Surely, even if it were to become a nuclear power (which is not the case, as things stand), it cannot become such a horrible threat to the world. The superior nuclear arsenal of the United States, Israel and others will annihilate Iran if it were to use its (presently non-existent) nuclear weapons against any other country. This is not to suggest that Iran should become a nuclear power. Indeed, for a credible nuclear free world, all existing nuclear countries should shed their nuclear weapons. Until then, they have no moral authority to enforce their will on others. Because as long as nuclear status is a power symbol as well as the weapon of last resort, it will continue to tempt nations able to go that way.

To understand Iran’s pariah status, one has to go back to its Islamic revolution in 1979. The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, a loyal US ally, was a terrible blow to the United States for reasons of geopolitics, strategy, and the control of oil supplies from the Middle East, of which Iran was a major producer. Iran was the first chink in the US’ strategy of controlling the Middle East, and could set a precedent for other countries in the region. On top of it, the new Islamic Iran was not only contemptuous of US power; it even had the temerity to humiliate the United States by holding hostage its embassy staff. Since then, on both sides, there is a continuing war of nerves.

In 1980, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, with US encouragement and support, to assert Iraq’s sovereignty over the vital Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The resultant war between the two countries lasted eight years, with an estimated million dead and wounded--- perhaps even more. Iran suffered the most in human lives lost, with the war ending in a stalemate and a UN ceasefire. But it wobbled the Iranian regime and set back its political agenda of promoting the Islamic revolution through its example. And that was not an inconsiderable gain for the United States and its Middle Eastern allies comprising the region’s dictators and kings. These countries, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others, were feeling uncomfortable and insecure from Iran’s Islamic revolution.

The irony of it is that Saddam Hussein’s Iran adventure set the stage for his destruction at the hands of his benefactors, the United States and its allies. An important reason for Saddam’s invasion and occupation of Iraq (illegal as it was) was his country’s large financial debts incurred through borrowings from neighbors like Kuwait. At the time they were only happy to lend all that Saddam wanted because he was fighting for all of them against the dreaded new Islamic regime of Iran. And when he was virtually defeated (because Iran was ready to fight on), Kuwait asked for its money back, which Saddam had no way of paying. In that desperate situation, he decided to annex Kuwait and solve all his financial problems and more by taking over the country’s oil wealth. He had reportedly mentioned his plans of annexing Kuwait to the US ambassador in his country who, the story goes, didn’t raise any objection. Which Saddam took as clearance from the United States, with their close relationship forged during the Iran-Iraq war.

As we know, Saddam’s Kuwait invasion led to the first Gulf war in which the United States defeated Iraqi forces and Kuwait was restored to its ruling dynasty with Iraq required to pay reparations. It was also subjected to a harsh regime of UN sanctions, impacting its population, especially women and children. The United States just stopped short of overthrowing the Saddam regime, which task was subsequently completed by President George Bush senior’s son after he became President in 2001. The second Gulf war was unleashed on Iraq because of Saddam regime’s alleged links with the terrorists as well as its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And that was a lie. But he had to go any way, as he had outlived his usefulness against Iran and was too difficult--- among other things. However, initially, the speed with which the US forces advanced made Iraq’s neighbors, like Iran and Syria, nervous lest it might be their turn next. They became keen to cooperate with the US to hunt down terrorists in their own backyards and to generally improve relations with the United States. But, at the time, the US was in a celebratory mode, with President Bush declaring the “mission accomplished” on the decks of a US warship.

The US was on a mission to bring about democracy and freedom in the region under its control and supervision and to have uninterrupted access to oil supplies. At the same time, the demonstrative effect of strong and successful US action was supposed to have salutary effect on groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinians in occupied territories. In other words, it will not only reassert firmly the US control and dominance but also solve Israel’s security situation in a volatile region. This was the time when there was so much talk of reintroducing benign imperialism and to make the United States’ dominant role in the world clear cut both in words and deeds. The point of recalling all this is to note that Iran’s clerical regime is still around, though it has multiple problems and challenges at home, as we shall analyze later.

An important, if not determining factor, in the US obsession with Iran is the role Israel and the powerful Jewish lobby plays in the formulation of its foreign and strategic policies in the region, with Iran perceived as a serious threat. Iran has been dismissive of Israel and a strong proponent of the Palestinian cause. President Ahmadinejad has made provocative statements denying that the Holocaust ever happened. Similarly, he doesn’t accept the legitimacy of the Israeli state, promising to eliminate it. Against this backdrop, Israel sees an existential threat from Iran’s nuclear program. And wants to bomb its nuclear plants to preempt it. Obviously, it would prefer the US to do it, as Iran is seen as a global threat. If not, it would like to have comprehensive US backing.

Lately, the United States and its allies have ratcheted up the pressure on Iran, following an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report pointing to “credible” evidence suggesting Iran is working towards developing nuclear weapons. But there is nothing really new in this because Iran has been accused of doing this for a number of years now, even though the US intelligence suggested it otherwise not so long ago. Indeed, there is no hard evidence that Iran is working to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But the IAEA report is convenient to launch another concerted campaign and to impose another layer of sanctions on Iran.

The upshot of the new sanctions is to put a total economic embargo on Iran by the US and its allies. At the same time, Iran is being told that the US is keeping all its options open to force it to forgo its nuclear program. Which obviously means that the US is not ruling out military means including, presumably, bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, Israel is letting it be known that it is studying plans to bomb Iranian nuclear plants. To emphasize the urgency of the situation, Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, has reportedly said that his country has less than a year to act.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s credibility recently took a serious hit when a conversation between President Sarkozy of France and President Obama was picked up while talking about Netanyahu at the G-20 summit. During their tête-à-tête, when a mike was still on, Sarkozy said: “I cannot stand him. He’s is a liar.” To which Obama replied, “You are fed up with him? I have to deal with him everyday.” Now Israeli publicists are trying to make out an argument that Netanyahu’s image should not distract from the view that he is the authentic voice of his country on the question of Iranian nuclear threat to Israel and the need for a preemptive strike.

In a recent newspaper article David Landau, a former editor-in-chief of the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, wrote: “Israel was created from the ashes of Auschwitz. Its primary mission is ‘never again.’” He added, “The world needs to recognize that Netanyahu authentically articulates that perspective and that reality.” But if Israel were to unilaterally bomb Iranian nuclear plants, it would not only face a massive Iranian counter-attack but is also likely to create a major crisis in the Middle East with Israel at the receiving end of it which might, for once, transcend the Shia-Sunni divide to face a common Israeli threat to the region.

Landau doesn’t under-rate the dangers of bombing Iran on its own. He reflects the calculation of many in Israel, including its government, when he writes: “Against all that [the dangers and consequences for Israel] is the calculation, carefully unspoken but present nevertheless, that a unilateral Israeli strike would trigger massive American intervention against Iran’s nuclear program…because Washington would have an overwhelming interest in ‘finishing the job’ that Israel began.” Is Landau the medium to openly convey the message of his government? It certainly seems like when he finishes his article with a warning of sorts: “The bluffer [Netanyahu] isn’t bluffing. Let’s hope Obama, Sarkozy and the rest are hearing him loud and clear.”

Even as this kind of drum beating is going on, Iran’s detractors hope that, “The regime in Tehran is deeply unpopular and may yet implode.” That may be so but there is no better way to rally Iranians around the regime when the country is in grave danger of facing a foreign attack.

It is true that the clerical regime in Iran is beset with serious internal problems. The presidential elections in 2009, and the brutal crackdown on the opposition, dented the regime’s legitimacy. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s return to presidency was very controversial, with some regarding it as a cruel farce. Having made it to the presidency second time with the support of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad is not comfortable with the over-riding political authority of his mentor. He seems keen to set up his own power base to challenge Khamenei. In this connection, an interesting article published in a recent issue of the New York Review of Books, written by an “anonymous” Iran expert, is quite significant. It says the rupture between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad was provoked by “Esfandiyar Rahim Mashaei, President Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff and close advisor [two of them are also related, with Mashaei’s daughter married to the President’s son]…” Mashaei is “reputed to be in contact with the Twelfth Imam--- a messianic figure…” believed to be in hiding since the tenth century.”

Ahmadinejad has resisted attempts by the Supreme leader to have Mashaei removed, but his efforts to have him groomed as his successor (when he leaves the presidency) seems doomed. Seeking to set up a higher political and religious authority than Khameini in the person of Mashaei, as a medium with the Twelfth Imam, is like making the Supreme leader irrelevant. It doesn’t look like this will work because, for one, Mashaei, with some of President’s other cronies, is involved in an embezzlement/banking scandal. And, second, Ahmadinejad’s regime has been quite incompetent in managing the country’s economy. The unemployment is high, inflation is raging and Iran’s middles class is unhappy with the country’s state of affairs. And with a tighter Western regime of sanctions, things are going to get worse for the mass of people. However, any foreign attack on Iranian nuclear installations, and the consequent series of events, will become the glue that holds the country together under the existing regime.

Note: this article was first published in the Daily Times