Asia-Pacific’s great power game

By S.P.SETH

While China continues to have problems with some of its Southeast Asian neighbors over competing claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea waters, the United States is going ahead with strengthening its naval presence in the Pacific.

The backdrop to this is a threat from a rising China to edge out the United States from the region and assert its dominance. The US is not taking it lying down as it regards Asia-Pacific region strategically and economically important to its national interests.

Some recent developments highlight the dangers. When Barack Obama visited Australia last November, the two countries agreed to upgrade their defense ties with Australia providing facilities in its north for the basing and rotation of US troops.

The US will also have naval and air facilities in Australia’s north and west, apparently to deal with any threat from China. At the same time, there are reports that the Australian territory of Cocos Island in the Indian Ocean might be readied for surveillance of China’s growing military presence in the region.

China has reacted angrily, as pointed out in an earlier article, conveying its displeasure strongly to Australia’s Foreign Minister Bob Carr, when he recently visited China, calling it a throw back to the Cold War era.

The reaction was even more pointed when Australia’s Defense Minister followed his ministerial colleague on a China visit.   Defense Minister Stephen Smith and his entourage reportedly left their mobile phones and laptops in Hong Kong before proceeding on their official China visit.

This precaution was considered necessary because such devices were believed to have been compromised during previous ministerial visits to China.  

If China were engaging in spying on visiting Australian dignitaries, its main reason would be to access important information about its defense ties with the United States and to what extent these are directed against China.

 It caused quite a flutter here when a new book by a an Australian journalist reportedly revealed that Australia’s 2009 defense white paper contained a secret unpublished section that contained alarming war scenarios with China.

Stephen Smith has, of course, dismissed these claims. But the point is that there is a lot of distrust and misunderstanding on both sides.

 Australia is engaged in a delicate balancing act between China and the USA. China is now Australia’s biggest trading partner with much of its export income from exports to China.

Concurrently, the United States is its closest strategic partner, viewed as underwriting its security from a regional threat, apparently from China. Australia’s upgraded security ties with the US are a form of insurance.

It is feared that China might at some point be tempted to do to Australia what Japan did to China and other regional countries before and during WW11. Which is to attack and occupy the country to access steady and adequate supplies of raw materials for its economic growth.

This is reflected in growing popular opposition in Australia to Chinese investments in resource industry (like mining), and agricultural land.

Peter Hartcher, international editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, cautioned in a recent column that such opposition to Chinese investments was dangerous, revoking “Japan’s policy of occupying its nearest neighbors in the 1930s [that] was transformed into an all-out war after the US imposed a trade embargo on it. The Pacific War followed and Japan threatened Australia with invasion until the US defeated it…”

This caution, by itself, is indicative of the deep fear in Australia of China’s growing power and the consequent rationale of an even stronger security connection with the US.

Another important development is the growing warmth in US-Vietnam relations. Although the two countries were bitter enemies not long ago, the turn around in their relations is an extraordinary development. 

An important reason is their shared concern about China’s assertive role in the region, especially its sovereignty claim over the South China Sea.

The US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent visit to the Cam Ranh Bay base in Vietnam, once a US naval base during the Vietnam War, is a testimony to the new warmth in their relationship. 

During his Vietnam visit, he didn’t mince his words about the US’s desire to make Cam Ranh Bay once again into a US base, but this time against China, if need be.

He declared that, “It will be particularly important to be able to work with partners like Vietnam; to be able to use harbors like this as we move our ships from our ports on the [US] West Coast, [and] our stations here in the Pacific.”  

Though Vietnam is playing down any US military connection, it is significant that the two countries, last year, signed an agreement on defense cooperation.

It is pertinent to point out that Cam Ranh Bay is one of the South China Sea’s best natural harbors, and hence an ideal spot to watch and impede China’s moves in these contested waters.

Not surprisingly, the deputy chief of general staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that, “The South China Sea is not America’s business… It is between China and its neighbors.”

This is precisely the problem because there are multiple regional claimants to South China Sea islands, Vietnam among them. There was recently a naval spat when Vietnam accused Chinese ships of cutting the cables of a survey ship it was deploying in its (claimed also by China) waters.

It is therefore easy to see the shared strategic ground between the US and Vietnam in regard to South China Sea sovereignty issue.

As South China Sea is a busy shipping lane for trade and passage of naval ships, it is feared that China might interfere with such passage claiming it as its national highway.

In the midst of all these regional tensions (as also between China and the Philippines) the US has announced that it would be increasing the size of its naval deployment in the Pacific from 50 to 60 per cent.

Panetta has reportedly said the US would maintain six aircraft carriers in the region, complemented by the arrival of Joint Strike Fighters and the Virginia-class fast-attack submarines. China too is modernizing and expanding its naval forces, including “carrier killer” anti-ship missiles and submarines.

 Apart from China and the USA, some of the regional countries too are engaged in building up their navies. All in all, there is enough happening in terms of naval acquisition and deployment to cause real concern for regional stability. And if one add to it Taiwan and North Korea, the picture looks even more depressing.

In this great game of power re-alignment in the Asia-Pacific region, Panetta has emphasized: “Make no mistake—in a steady, deliberate and sustainable way---the United States military is rebalancing and brings enhanced capabilities to this vital region.”

A Chinese strategist doesn’t share Panetta’s enthusiasm. His take is that, “Even though the US has a wonderful plan of pivoting, rebalancing or whatever into Asia-Pacific affairs…I really doubt they can find the trillions of dollars that is needed.”

Whatever the future, and it doesn’t seem terribly inviting, the great power game in the Asia-Pacific region is truly begun.

Carnage in Syria

By S P SETH

The carnage in Syria looks like never ending. The recent grisly scenes of battered corpses posted on the internet is the worst of its kind since the uprising began March last year. The deaths of over 100 civilians, including 49 children and 32 women, add to the mounting death toll of over 10,000 and rising. It all happened in Houla, a township in Homs province. Apparently, the military was trying to wrest control of this town from the rebels. After doing their bit of pounding the town with heavy artillery, the pro-regime militia was left to finish the job. And they went about it with their customary brutality.  The army seems to be forgetting, though, that, despite the heavy price they are paying, the rebels are not deterred. Therefore what worked for Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, in 1982 when he unleashed unrestrained brutality in Hama killing upwards of 10,000 people, is not working in 2012.

There are two reasons why it is not working. First: the rebellion is much more widespread this time. The military is, therefore, overstretched. Second: the Arab Spring, that has overwhelmed much of the Arab world, inspires the rebel movement in Syria. Its success in Tunisia and Egypt had its contagion effect in Syria. The Bashar regime might, therefore, need to rethink its strategy of violent repression as the only course before the upsurge in Syria reaches a point of no return, if it is not already happened.

Not surprisingly, the killings in Houla have created even greater outrage internationally, leading the UN Security Council to condemn the “outrageous use of force against the civilian population”; calling on both the government and the rebels to end violence. The Security Council statement was issued after Russia was accommodated in not apportioning all the blame on the Assad regime. According to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, both sides in the Syrian conflict “had a hand” in the deaths. He maintained that, “The guilt has to be determined objectively. No one is saying that the government is not guilty, and no one is saying that the armed militants are not guilty.” Which the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, then visiting Moscow, didn’t dispute though he made the point that “… it [the regime] has the primary responsibility for such violence.” In other words, Russia and China stand in the way of a Security Council resolution for international intervention in Syria to stop killings.

Of course, the US and its allies might decide to intervene without a UN resolution but this seems unlikely. Even though they are vociferous in their condemnation of the Syrian atrocities, none has so far shown any appetite for armed intervention. Calling it a “vicious assault… on a residential neighborhood” the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said that: “… the United States will work with the international community to intensify our pressure on Assad and his cronies, whose rule by murder and fear must come to an end.” France is simply making plans to host a Friends of Syria meeting, while Britain said it was in urgent talks with allied countries on “a strong international response.”

In the US, President Obama is in the midst of an election campaign for another term. One of the selling points of his campaign is that, under him, the US is disengaging from its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. That advantage will be nullified if the US were back in another bloody conflict, this time in Syria. And this could even be bloodier than Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another reason is that President Obama only recently made an important decision to shift the focus of US strategic policy to the Asia-Pacific region. During the last decade when the US has been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has made important inroads into Asia-Pacific region to the detriment of US power and interests. Another US shift to the Middle East, this time in Syria, will only further fortify China’s strategic advantage. Third: the US global overreach in the last decade, if not before, has significantly contributed to the country’s indebtedness, thus making another military adventure an unlikely proposition. The US’ European allies are in an even worse situation economically.

Obviously, the Bashar regime is aware of these constraints of the western countries that gives it some leverage in a very tight situation.

Therefore, as long as Russia and China do not join the US in the Security Council for concerted international action  (a combination of armed de-stabilization and comprehensive sanctions), the regime might be able to prolong its life. So far, Moscow is proving a tough nut to crack with its considerable economic and strategic stakes in Syria.

There is some suggestion that Russia might be persuaded to buy a Yemen-like compromise where its unpopular president was sent into exile, leaving the rump of his government intact. In Yemen, though, both Saudi Arabia and the United States had considerable political and economic leverage to swing the deal. But this is not the case in Syria. If applied to Syria, this would mean that Bashar and his cronies will go into exile leaving rest of the system and structure unchanged. Russia will thus continue to have strategic primacy in the country, where it will be business as usual minus Bashar and few of his close cohorts.

Will Russia fall for it? It seems unlikely except as part of a wider strategic deal in which Russian political, strategic and economic interests worldwide, seen as threatened by the US and NATO, are assured. For instance, Russia is very angry over the stationing of US missiles in its strategic backyard, in Poland and elsewhere, as part of a defense system against a perceived Iranian nuclear threat. It also fears that the United States and its allies are seeking to politically destabilize the Putin regime by fomenting and encouraging anti-Putin rallies in Russia. Russia has also incorporated parts of the neighboring Georgian territory following a border war between the two countries some time ago. It would like legitimization of that from the US. Moscow also wants to join the World Trade Organization to reap trade benefits, and the list goes on. And it probably would also want some assurances against military attack on Iran by Israel and/or the US. It is a long list and hence difficult to be tied down to the Syrian situation.

Despite all the humane concern for carnage in Syria, the international power brokers have their own agenda. The US, for instance, would like to break the close links between Iran and Syria, and their perceived disruptive role in the region.

As for a Yemen-like solution for Syria, it will be difficult to sustain even if it were feasible. The two situations are quite different. First: Syria is much more diverse in terms of its ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. And the Bashar regime, though unpopular with the Sunni majority, has the support of the minorities, and a good section of its trading and middle class.

Its Christian population, though not enamored of the Bashar family dictatorship, are still thankful for its social and religious liberalism. They are free to practice their rituals and social modes.  And they are afraid of the alternative of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, as they see it.

Second: the regime is not subject to outside dictates, perhaps not even from Russia. Its power base in the army and the country’s Alawite political class remains intact. Therefore, it might still have enough life to keep going. However, unless the Bashar regime relents on its policy of killing its own people, it might only be a matter of time before it too becomes history. But that doesn’t mean the country’s mysery will be over any time soon. A prolonged civil war might make it even messier and bloodier.