Afghan imbroglio
By S P SETH
Some of the recent events in Afghanistan might as well be the script for a horror movie. We have the spectacle of US soldiers urinating on corpses of their Taliban enemy, burning copies of Koran and, the most recent dastardly act of, an American soldier systematically breaking into some Afghan homes and killing family members, including women and children, without any rhyme or reason. The killings are said to be the random acts of a lone US soldier. But try telling this to the Afghan people who detect a pattern in US cruelty with no respect for Afghan lives.
Whatever the explanation, the damage is done with the US headed for exit from Afghanistan, sooner rather than later. The US, in any case, was already looking for a dignified exit by 2014 but that might not be happening now. The Taliban has suspended its tenuous contacts with the US in Qatar, with no new interlocutors in sight in such a charged atmosphere. And Karzai has asked the US to confine its troops to major bases, with a corresponding lull in counter-insurgency operations and nation building tasks for the period ahead. Of course, Karzai doesn’t want to be left behind the Taliban in voicing displeasure and frustration with the US. It is increasingly becoming an untenable situation for the US and NATO military presence in Afghanistan, and how it is sorted out would remain to be seen.
If history is any guide, the British had an awful time in the 19th century with their recurrent military expeditions into Afghanistan. In 1841, its entire force of 16,500 perished but for one soldier. The Soviet Union’s experience in 1980s was equally ignominious, eventually leading to a humiliating withdrawal after many casualties and lost morale. With some luck the US might stage a more orderly withdrawal and without total humiliation.
Ever since the US surge of 2009 with some initial successes, the military operations in Afghanistan have largely been a holding operation to contain the Taliban. The other two elements of the US strategy---to secure the interior and foster nation building ---have not made much headway. The Taliban were always around, making tactical retreat here and there, with people collaborating with them either out of fear or loyalty. As for raising the new Afghan national army and police forces with funding and training from the US and allies, they are proving highly porous riddled with Taliban influence and volunteers.
Since the US hasn’t really succeeded in creating a popular national Afghan counter-force to the Taliban, the prognosis for the country is for more chaos and bloodshed after the US withdrawal. Because of the Karzai government’s virtually total dependence on US armed presence and funding, it might not take long for the entire edifice to collapse with the new Afghan army splintering into groups fighting for competing power contenders or operating free-lance.
The Karzai government has very little popular support in the country for two good reasons. First: it is seen as American creation and imposition. And second: it is corrupt to the bone. And no matter what Karzai does, now and then, to attack US acts and behavior in Afghanistan, he lacks credibility. And the time is coming when his contradictory, but ineffectual politics of playing all sides of the game, might land him in an awful lot of trouble with no escape hatch.
On surface it might seem that the Taliban will be able to reclaim their lost kingdom in Afghanistan. Earlier they had come on top in the civil war that ensued after the Soviet withdrawal. They had three advantages at that time. First: they had, by and large, a clean image as being free of corruption. Second: after the mayhem of the civil war and lawlessness, their commitment to enforce strict Islamic rule found favor with many Afghans. And third: they had Pakistan’s support for its own strategic reasons, particularly to have a dependent and reliable Afghan regime for, what came to be known, as “defense in depth” against India.
Let us see how far these factors still favor the Taliban. They still are relatively clean compared to the Karzai regime that has become synonymous with corruption. They are likely to have a problem, though, with enforcing strict Islamic rule after the relatively liberal social mores that have developed in some cities, even if they are benefitting only a small class. The limited start to the education of girls is one example. There is also some relaxation of restrictions on entertainment, as with music, films and television. All this is counter to the Taliban precepts and practice, though they are capable of brutal repression.
They still have Pakistan’s support, with their leadership reportedly sheltering in Pakistan. Whether they will do Pakistan’s bidding, when in power, is another thing. It would seem that their rise to power in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal, did more harm to Pakistan than any good. For one, Pakistani Taliban have been an outgrowth of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with disastrous consequences for the country. Second, their sheltering and support of the al Qaeda leadership, blamed for the 9/11 bombing of the US targets, made Pakistan the witting or unwitting theatre of the US war against Afghanistan. The consequences for Pakistan of all this are still playing out.
In any case, any possible Taliban ascendancy in the post-US Afghanistan is unlikely to bring lasting peace and unity to Afghanistan and, by implication, to Pakistan. At best the Taliban might become dominant in the Pushtun region of the country, setting in motion another civil war against other ethnic and sectarian communities. The Pashtuns, the largest community at 42 per cent, are not the majority. And the Taliban have virtually no support among other sizeable groups of Afghans. The Tajiks are reportedly the second biggest at 27 per cent, followed by Hazaras and Uzbeks at 9 per cent each, with small communities of Aimak (4 per cent), Turkmens (3 per cent) and Baloch (2 percent).
When Afghanistan had some stability under King Zahir Shah, it functioned as a loose coalition of diverse tribes, clans, sects and ethnic groups operating basically as autonomous groups. The overthrow of the King in 1973 by his cousin, Prince Daud, started a chain of events that has meant a continuing state of instability and warfare to this day. Which doesn’t mean that the solution lies in bringing back monarchy. What it means is that any system that tends to centralize authority in Kabul, be it under the Taliban or whatever, will simply prolong Afghan agony. There is need for a flexible and accommodative political dispensation with tolerance in diversity. The Taliban are hardly the kind for a process of national reconciliation and unity, with their ideological and religious rigidity. Not only will they prove divisive in Afghanistan but are likely to plunge even Pakistan further into confusion and chaos.