North Korea and the nuclear question

S P SETH

North Korea always makes a good copy for the media, whether it is about hunger in that country and/or dynastic leadership succession. Better still when it rattles (tests) a nuclear bomb or two and, recently, by putting a satellite into orbit, raising alarm bells in Japan and South Korea, with the US rallying the world against this new danger from long range missiles. There are all sorts of horror stories that this mad regime in Pyongyang might one of these days rain bombs on Japan and South Korea and even threaten the US’ west coast by mounting a nuclear warhead on its long-range missiles.

Of course, some other countries have nuclear bombs and missiles too, and many more of them, but they supposedly handle their nuclear arsenals responsibly. But you can’t trust countries like North Korea (and Iran) to exercise responsibility. They might, in a moment of pique or religious zealotry or, who knows what, blow up the world. North Korea is a rogue country anyway and part of the former President Bush’s axis of evil. And this is notwithstanding the fact that the nuclear proliferation treaty is discriminatory in favor of the nuclear haves of the pre-treaty (in the seventies) period.

It sought to divide the world into legitimate (pre-treaty) nuclear powers and illegitimate (post-treaty) nuclear countries and those seeking to break into this exclusive club. The latter, particularly those seeking to break into the nuclear club, are subject to international sanctions like North Korea and Iran. It is not clear how such sanctions work to dissuade or pressure these countries from abjuring nuclear weapons. For instance, India and Pakistan were subjected to severe sanctions but they still managed to acquire nuclear weapons.

North Korea, with all its isolation and international sanctions, has twice tested an atomic device and has now put a satellite into orbit, which makes it into a nuclear capable country. In this big power play of punishing the so-called rogue regimes (Iran is another one), it is the people of North Korea (and Iran) who are paying a heavy price. What is the point of punishing North Korea with isolation and sanctions, when its already impoverished people are in a state of despair?

The question to examine here is: What makes the quest for nuclear weapons so attractive even at the cost of inviting some heavy punishment by the club of the nuclear haves? An important reason is that it invests a nuclear country with a certain status, suggesting that it might not be trifled with. Whether it actually translates into power or not is debatable. It creates a deterrence of sorts that comes from having the ultimate weapon that can destroy the enemy. But it is largely illusory because nuclear weapons, due to their massive destructive power, cannot easily be translated into actual use. The nuclear power that might be tempted to use them against an enemy has to contend with the fear of retaliation leading to a nuclear Armageddon.

It is true that the United States used two atomic bombs on Japan to force it to surrender during WW11. But at that time it alone had the bomb and its lethality, though massive even then in destroying Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was still limited. Since then there are other countries with nuclear weapons of mass destruction like hydrogen bombs and the likes. Therefore, risks of translating nuclear power into military use are massive. And one would hope that there are multiple layers of control in every nuclear country to prevent a deliberate or accidental explosion.

Still, the danger is there requiring concerted international action to deal with nuclear proliferation. But this will not work as long as the world is divided into nuclear haves and have-nots. Therefore for any process of non-proliferation it has to start with the permanent members of the club, like the United States, Russia, China and so on.

When the US emerged out of WW11 with atomic bomb and its manifest success (destruction) against Japan, the Soviet Union suddenly felt vulnerable. And it immediately started working on having one to redress the balance. Indeed, the race for nuclear weapons between the US and the Soviet Union was an important, if not a determining, factor in the Cold War that ensued between the two camps led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union became a nuclear power in 1949 and after that there was no stopping it from catching up with the United States. At times, it looked like outstripping the US. Other countries joined the club like Britain and France and China too became a member. With the nuclear members being also the permanent members of the UN Security Council, they sought to keep the club exclusive.

And when their privileged position and power was breached by other countries or threatened with  breach they sought to use their collective power to keep everyone else out. Which brought about the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1970. Other countries were enjoined to sign the treaty to forgo any nuclear ambition or face the consequences if they decided to go nuclear. A regime of sanctions followed when some countries refused to follow this self-serving international order, with North Korea being disciplined now for that.

North Korea is, however, protected in some ways because of China. Not that China is supportive of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions but because of its strategic connection with it going back to the days of the Korean War (1950-53) when it intervened effectively to stop the US advance towards Yalu river marking the border between the two countries. With South Korea a US ally, China is not keen on upsetting the strategic balance in the Korean peninsula by becoming part of the stringent US-led sanctions regime against North Korea. Pyongyang is heavily dependent on Beijing for aid, trade and political support and any withdrawal of such Chinese support could bring down the regime in North Korea creating a flood of refugees heading China’s way.

China has been helpful in providing the venue and support for periodic six-power talks (South Korea, North Korea, China, United States, Russia and Japan) to peacefully resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation in North Korea, but there hasn’t been much progress towards any meaningful advance. For North Korea, its nuclear and missile program is a bargaining counter for international recognition (principally from the United States) of its regime and the system, energy security, aid and trade. In return, it will phase out its nuclear program depending on the progress made in aid, trade and a replacement program of new nuclear plants (built by the US, Japan and South Korea), designed for peaceful generation of energy for North Korea.

An agreement broadly on these lines, particularly to build up two proliferation resistant nuclear reactors, was signed under President Clinton’s administration in 1994. But under his successor, President George Bush, North Korea was declared part of the axis of evil and things have since gone from bad to worse. It is probably time to revisit that agreement and to rework a new framework for a peaceful resolution of the intractable North Korean nuclear issue.

Note: e-mail contact; sushilpseth@aol.com