The riddle that is North Korea

S P SETH

One way, and a simplistic one, to look at the crisis in the Korean peninsula is to regard its leader Kim Jong-un and his regime as dangerously crazy.  And if they are not restrained they might blow up the region, if not the world. The histrionics of Kim junior (he is the grandson of the country’s founder, Kim Il-sung), and the carefully choreographed images of North Korean people hero-worshipping their leader, as played up on the TV screens, tend to lend credence to this madcap image. His recent threats to annihilate the United Sates and South Korea to preempt their invasion of his country emanate from the fear of US-South Korean military exercises with North Korea obviously as a contingent target. Kim’s rhetoric certainly is overblown but it is not entirely groundless from the viewpoint of a regime that is isolated, is subject to wide ranging sanctions and told, more or less, that if it wouldn’t abandon its nuclear program it would be hunted down until it sees sense and/or replaced by a more pliable regime.

Pyongyang is not even sure that its surrender on the nuclear issue will be its salvation because its experience with the 1994 agreement of phased denuclearization in return for western political legitimacy, economic aid and trade didn’t proceed to its satisfaction. And subsequent talks at the periodic China-sponsored six-country (the two Koreas, USA, Japan, Russia and China) have gone nowhere. This is partly because Pyongyang is under pressure to abandon its nuclear program before it sees any benefits from it. In this situation, North Korea seems to think its only leverage vis-à-vis his enemies is its nuclear deterrence.

This is not to suggest that Pyongyang’s reading of its besieged situation is entirely correct, though it looks like that to them. When the US-South Korean military exercises are held, especially to drive him the point that the North’s nuclear programme won’t be tolerated (or else), it simply drives an already paranoid regime into an over-drive partly to make its case to the world (though no one seems to be listening), and partly for domestic consumption to underline that Kim junior is in compete control and will beat back the potential invader(s). And with no way to back down honorably, the Kim regime continued to raise its pitch. For instance, it advised foreign missions in Pyongyang to withdraw their personnel for their safety because there might be a war soon. But the missions simply ignored the advice because they didn’t see any real danger of war.

It also advised foreign nationals in South Korea to withdraw from the country because Pyongyang didn’t want their lives endangered in a likely war that might involve nuclear weapons. This was obviously a mischievous attempt at creating panic among foreigners and to damage South Korea’s investment and trade climate.  But South Korea’s capital, Seoul, about 45 miles from the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas, still continued to function like the bustling metropolis it is. There was no general troops’ mobilization to suggest that war was imminent.

Living in virtual isolation, with very little contact with the outside world, North Korea seems to believe that its apocalyptic threats would create an international crisis that might lead to some sort of a process to defuse the situation to its advantage. That hasn’t happened yet. Western media and governments were reporting movement of a couple of North Korean intermediate missiles to the eastern coast that might put Japan, South Korea and US territory of Guam at risk. But at the same time, the risk was discounted because these missiles were not tested and functional. There were also reports from usual sources that North Korea might be readying for a missile test, as well as a nuclear test, to coincide with the birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, which has now passed. Even with all this hysteria, South Korea and the US appeared relaxed.

 Even with all the bluster, particularly from Pyongyang, there now appears some toning down of the rhetoric. Seoul has offered dialogue, which, not surprisingly, has been rejected by Pyongyang. The US let it be known that any counter response to North’s aggression will be measured and proportionate. In other words, if North were to shower artillery shells on a South Korean island, the response from Seoul and the US will be limited and local without escalating it into a wider conflict. Similarly, it was reported that the US would only counter act on a North Korean missile launch if it was headed towards Japan, South Korea or Guam, but not if the missile was headed into the sea. The new message from the US is “strategic patience” to let Pyongyang wear itself out with its rhetoric.

In a dangerously evolving situation, though, China’s role is critical because it is North Korea’s closest neighbor as well as a strategic ally, even though Pyongyang doesn’t seem to be heeding Beijing’s message of nuclear restraint. There is a general feeling that if Beijing were to pull the plug on North Korea by cutting off food and energy supplies, the Kim regime would  have nowhere to go. And this is precisely China’s worry because it wouldn’t want the regime to collapse for fear of creating a multitude of problems for itself in terms of a potential flood of refugees into China, and the disappearance of a useful strategic buffer right on the doorsteps of a potentially hostile US-South Korean strategic nexus.

But China too doesn’t appear unduly worried. It has, though, publicly stated the need for restraint on both sides. President Xi Jinping’s, in his address to a recent international gathering in China, said, “No one should be allowed to throw a region and even the whole world into chaos for selfish gains.” This was read in the west as a rebuke to Pyongyang.  But since he didn’t name names, he might even be referring to the US and South Korea for upping the ante through their joint military exercises and the movement of US naval ships and other military hardware into the region.

The US Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent China visit did elicit a reiteration of a US-China commitment in support of denuclearization in North Korea through peaceful means. Which might make China-sponsored Beijing forum of six-party talks once again relevant. However, this is unlikely to provide a lasting solution to the nuclear question, considering that Pyongyang is against any bargaining on its nuclear deterrence. Which means that it will not give up its nuclear status for trade, aid or political legitimacy. In other words, North Korea’s nuclear status will continue to be a destabilizing regional factor.

Contact: sushilpseth@yahoo.com.au